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Abstract 
This paper studies how the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 changed market access and inﬂuenced 
the economic geography of the United States. We compute shipment distances with and without the canal 
from each US county to each other US county and to key international ports and compute the resulting 
change in market access. We relate this change to population changes in 20-year intervals from 1880 to 
2000. We ﬁnd that a 1 percent increase in market access led to a total increase of population by around 6 
percent. We compute similar elasticities for wages, land values and immigration from out of state. When 
we decompose the eﬀect by industry, we ﬁnd that tradable (manufacturing) industries react faster than non-
tradable (services), with a fairly similar aggregate eﬀect. 
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1 Introduction
The effect of changes in market access on the spatial equilibrium is an old question in
the economic literature. It is of practical importance to policy makers that consider
investing in transportation infrastructure. Typically, this question is addressed by
case studies that consider the effects of railroads, highways, ports and other changes
in transport infrastructure. Here we use the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914
and see how it influenced the economic geography of the United States in following
decades. The opening of the canal was one of the largest changes to international
shipment distances, leading to big changes of market access for every US county,
while at the same time giving much variation of the degree of this change within
the US. The opening took place at a time when international trade overwhelmingly
happened by ship, which makes this change in distances a more precise measure or
trade than it would be in later decades.
Contributions of this project include the following four: First, we build a dataset
of international and domestic market access for US counties for 1890 that may be
useful for other studies. We also measure the change in market access induced by the
Panama canal for each US county. Second, we show that there is a strong positive
causal effect of market access change on population growth throughout the 20th cen-
tury. Our main magnitude implies that an increase of market access of one percent
leads to a population that is around 6 percent larger in 1940, and 7 percent larger in
2000. This is an elasticity estimate that may be of use elsewhere. We also provide
related numbers for manufacturing wages, agricultural land prices and immigration
from out of state, and show that all these react positively to increased market ac-
cess. Third, we show that this effect seems to be fairly similar for tradable and
non-tradable industries overall, with tradable workers reacting faster initially, and
services catching up a little slower. Workers in agriculture react only by little. The
long-term average effect is similar for tradable and non-tradable workers. Finally,
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we use economic theory to provide a cost-benefit analysis of the canal that suggests
that the benefits from the canal easily outweigh the costs.
The basis of our dataset is an existing 20-year frequency county panel for the US
from 1880-2000 (Michaels et al 2012). This dataset also allows us to consider total
population growth and employment growth in agriculture, manufacturing and ser-
vices separately. We combine these data with US domestic transport costs in 1890
(Donaldson and Hornbeck 2016) and data on population and GDP of major interna-
tional ports (Pascali 2017). We compute shipment distances with and without the
canal from each US county to each other US county and to each international port.
We combine these data by computing the minimum distance from every county to
every major international port, and to every other county with and without the
canal. We then use a gravity-type framework to compute market access measures
that are distance weighted population measures for every county.
A first set of results describes the impact of the canal. Using our preferred set of
parameters, about three percent of US county pairs have improved domestic market
access as a result of the Canal and all have some improved international market
access, with much variation of the magnitude of the change throughout the coun-
try.1 On average, US counties experience a 6.3 percent total market access improve-
ment, which consists of a 2.7 percent domestic gain and a 5.8 percent international
one.
Looking at results over time we find that the canal had no effect on population
growth of counties in the Placebo period before its opening, from 1880-1900. It
has a significant positive effect in all the 20-year intervals after, particularly in the
period of the opening 1900-1920. After that we continue to observe a positive ef-
fect that declines monotonically over time. This continued positive effect on growth
reflects that the canal becomes more valuable over time as globalization intensifies.
1In a specification where we restrict ocean based trade to go via three main US ports, this
reduces to two percent of county pairs.
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All this is consistent with our priors. The sample is large enough that we can con-
sider heterogeneous effects. When we non-parametrically decompose the effect by
initial density deciles we find that there is a fairly linear and monotonic relation-
ship between improved market access and population growth, with no difference for
small or large counties. We also find that the effect rises linearly with treatment
intensity.
This paper relates to a large literature on the relationship between trade and growth
(Frankel and Romer 1999, Redding and Venables 2004, Pascali 2017, Bakker et al
2018, Donaldson 2018). Our setting is particularly close to Feyrer (2009), who
studies the impact of the closure of the Suez Canal following the Six Day War,
and to Hugot and Umana Dajud (2016), who examine the effects of the Panama
and Suez canals for international trade. Our paper differs in that we consider effects
within a country rather than across countries, and that we study a permanent change
over a longer time horizon. In this sense, this paper also relates to the literature
on location fundamentals and cities’ long-term development (Davis and Weinstein
2002, Bleakley and Lin 2012, Bosker and Buringh 2017, Hanlon 2017, Michaels
and Rauch 2018). Particularly related in that literature are papers that examine
the role of market access in determining city growth. Redding and Sturm (2008)
study the effect of the Iron Curtain on the development of towns in West Germany.
What we add to their findings is a more precise measurement of market access
changes in our setting. A paper by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) on the effects of
railroads is closely connected in data, econometric setup and research question. In a
broader sense, our paper is also connected to several other papers that have looked
at the growth implications of infrastructure measures that enhance market access.
In this literature, railroads have received particular attention2, but so have roads and
highways (Banerjee et al 2012, Duranton and Turner 2012, Faber 2014, Baum-Snow
2See, for example, Atack et al 2010, Hornung 2015, Jedwab and Moradi 2016, Berger and Enflo
2017, Bogart et al 2018, Donaldson 2018, Buechel and Kyburz 2019, Braun and Franke 2019
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et al 2019), and air links (Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott 2017). Finally, we also
contribute to a literature on the economic effects of the Panama Canal (Huebner
1915, Hutchinson and Ungo 2004, Maurer and Yu 2008) by adding our new measures
and findings.
The next section will give a brief overview of the history of the Panama Canal, and
present some facts on its usage today. Section 3 describes the dataset we assemble
for this project. Section 4 presents the main regression results. Section 5 presents a
few robustness checks on the main results. Section 6 uses the results in combination
with a theoretical model to produce an estimate of the welfare contribution to the
US by the canal, and uses it in a cost-benefit analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Panama Canal
The idea to connect the Atlantic and the Pacific to facilitate trade is an old one. A
priest by the name of Francisco Lo´pez de Go´mara drew an optimistic plan to dig
a canal in the area for the King of Castile already in 1552. A glance at a world
map shows that the obvious place to dig is in the area of today’s Nicaragua, Costa
Rica or Panama, where the oceans are separated only by a small strip of land. The
current canal in Panama is in fact close to the shortest possible passage. Nicaragua
was frequently considered as a viable alternative, offering a longer distance but with
lower heights to cross. Alexander von Humboldt wrote a study on a canal project in
this area in 1811, and likely discussed it with US president Jefferson, another early
proponent of this idea.3
An old Spanish trading route existed in the area of today’s canal from possibly
the 16th century. This heavily used path was developed by private entrepreneurs
into a railway line connecting the oceans that opened in 1855. This railway line
3The historic information in this section draws mainly on Cameron (1971), McCullough (1977)
and Maurer and Yu (2010).
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consisted of 76 kilometers of track and connected with ships at either end. This
railway line benefitted from the gold rush in California, and helped transport people
to California, as well as gold back. In the 19th century it had the heaviest volume
of freight of any railroad in the world. At some point its parent company was the
highest priced stock listed on the New York Stock exchange. Yet despite its great
success, the railway line had severe shortcomings, essentially excluding bulky or
heavy goods trade. It was not a useful substitute for a proper canal, and the idea to
dig remained a consideration for the US government and others. President Ulysses
S. Grant remarked in 1881 “To Europeans the benefits of and advantages of the
proposed canal are great, to Americans they are incalculable” (McCullough 1977, p.
26).
Yet despite the great importance of the canal to the United States, it was a French-
man who pioneered this project. After playing the central role in the construction of
the Suez Canal, French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps founded the ‘Panama Canal
Company’, obtained the rights to dig from the Colombian government (at the time
Panama was part of Colombia), raised private funds and started digging. Construc-
tion started in 1882. This project relied primarily on workers from the West Indies
as well as French engineers, but also sourced moderate amounts of supplies and
workers from the United States. The company underestimated the difficulties that a
combination of yellow fever, malaria, tropical climate and remoteness presented. It
also may have made an error in insisting on a canal at sea level. The company went
bankrupt in 1889. About 20.000 workers, mainly from the West Indies, died while
working for the French company, primarily from malaria and yellow fever. Many
French families lost money following the bankruptcy.
The project was abandoned, until President Theodore Roosevelt made it a priority
and revived it. He declared in his first message to congress in 1901: “No single
great material work [...] is of such consequence to the American people”. The US
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government bought the remains of the French company, and continued construction
from 1904. The US encouraged a revolution in Panama, and prevented the Colom-
bian government from interfering. This created the country of Panama and secured
control over the canal for the US government in its first decades. The canal was
completed and opened in 1914. 800 ships used it in 1916.
By 2018, the number of ships had increased to 15,000. Ships crossing the canal are
lifted and then lowered about 26 meters in several locks. In total it takes around
8-10 hours to cross. The United States are the main user of the canal: Around 67.7
percent of shipments have either their origin or destination in the United States.
This represents 175 million tons in 2018. The next beneficiaries are China (16
percent), Mexico, Chile and Japan (each around 12 percent), Peru and Colombia (9
percent). The main European beneficiaries are Spain and the Netherlands (1.9 and
1.8 percent respectively). Decomposing shipments by broad routes in 2018 reveals
that 78 million tons are shipped from the US East Coast to Asia, which is by far
the most important connection. Next comes the US East Coast and West Coast of
South America (37 million tons) followed by East Coast US and West Coast Central
America (17 million tons). Europe and the US West Coast exchange another 17
million tons through the canal. US intercoastal accounts for 8 million tons, as does
Asia and East-Central America and South America Intercoastal. Europe and the US
West Coast exchange 7 million tons (Panama Canal Authority 2018a, 2018b).
In this paper, we compare a world with the canal to one without the canal. When
do we expect to see a difference between the two? There could have been some
small effect of distance to the Panama Canal on trade from the time of the railway
in 1850. The years of construction of the Canal from 1882-1914 drew some resources
and people from the United States to Panama and may account for some small
effect. The opening of the canal in 1914 marks the greatest change to transport
costs we observe, and we expect big effects over this period. There is a question
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whether people’s expectations of the canal lead to measurable effects before 1914,
but we have reasons to doubt it. The closest year before the opening we use here is
the year 1900, before any construction or planning attempts by the US government.
At that time, construction of this project was of sufficient risk and difficulty that it
was uncertain after the French failure if it would be taken up again and if so when it
would be completed. In some of our regressions, we use 1880 as a base year, where
the impact of the Panama Canal likely had an even lesser effect on people’s location
choices within the US. It is also worth noting that politicians at the time, as well as
academic analysts of the canal, typically stress the military importance of the canal
first, and commercial impacts only second (Huebner 1915). The canal continues to
become more important throughout the 20th century as international trade increases,
as shipping technology improves, shipping volumes increase, and as the destination
markets grow, first Europe after the wars, followed by the rise of Asian countries.
For these reasons we expect a continued effect after 1914. The effect we report for
the years 1900-1920 and 1900-1940 are less influenced by these other factors, and
isolate the gains through the change in distances, the later effects adds additional
treatments through technology and the growth of destinations.
3 Data
Our dataset aims to construct transport costs and destination market sizes as they
were before the opening of the Canal, around 1900. We do not rely on information on
either destination markets or domestic transport costs in the US after the opening,
since both are endogenous to the new transport cost matrix. This implies that our
measurement of the market access induced by the canal is more precise in the earlier
decades of the 20th century than in the later ones.
The Panama Canal facilitates commerce between US coasts, but also between US
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and international ports. We measure both effects separately. To calculate how it
changed international market access, we draw on a dataset on major ports in the
19th century assembled by Pascali (2017). For every country, this dataset identifies
the primary ports in 1850, and assigns them the country’s respective population and
GDP data for 1900. We then calculate seaborne least-cost paths and distances from
every coastal county in the US to every major international port, using a 20x20km
grid of the world and ArcGIS’s “Cost Distance” tool. We calculate these distances
under two scenarios: Once with the Panama Canal being closed or not existent, once
with it being open.4
For every mainland US county, we then calculate the distance from this county’s
centroid to every international port. This distance consists of two components:
The distance from the US coast to the international port calculated before, and
the distance from the respective county to the coast. For the latter, we draw on a
1890 cost-distance matrix provided by Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). This matrix
takes into account railroads and canals with different cost parameters and therefore
gives a precise picture of the trade costs across counties in that period.
To add the within-US cost distances (measured in US$) and the distances to inter-
national harbors (measured in km), we first transform the domestic distance matrix
from monetary units to kilometers by scaling them such that the distances expressed
in kilometers match the great-circle distances for the average county pair5. Total
distance between county c and international port pint via domestic port pdom is cal-
culated as the minimum distance of all possible routes via all domestic ports
4Given the global scale of our analysis, and our interest in distances, we use a Azimuthal
Equidistant Projection of the world, centered around 39.83N 98.58W, the geographic center
of the United States. The maps we use are based on Manson et al (2018) for the US,
Bjorn Sandvik’s public domain map on world borders (available from http://thematicmapping.
org/downloads/world_borders.php), and the Rivers and lake centerlines dataset available
from Natural Earth (https://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-physical-vectors/
10m-rivers-lake-centerlines/).
5We also show a robustness check where we instead express all cost distances in dollars, assuming
a cost of 0.1 cent per km over the sea.
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dintcp = min[dcpdom + αdpdompint ].
One of the crucial parameters of this exercise is to define the relative cost of shipment
of one kilometer inland against one kilometer by sea, parameterized as α. This
parameter is such that α = 1 would imply that a kilometer of trade over sea costs
the same as a kilometer inland, while α = 1/2 implies that trading over sea is
half the cost of trading over land.6 Data on freight rates between Cardiff and Port
Royal in Pascali (2017) suggest that transporting one ton over a straight-line mile
over the ocean cost around 0.15 cents in 1890. This can then be compared to the
cost of land-based transportation. Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) assume that
the cost of transporting a ton-mile via railroad was 0.63 cents in 1890. This would
imply a value of α of around 0.25. However, this assumes that any land-based
transportation could be done via railroads and thus seems overly conservative. For
a more realistic comparison, we calculated the average Donaldson-Hornbeck cost for
a straight-line mile, which is roughly 1.7 cents per ton-mile in 1890. Comparing
this with the ocean transportation costs from above suggests an α of around 1
11
.
Even this might be on the conservative end, as Maurer and Yu (2008) estimate
that the variable cost for a ton-mile over the ocean was only 0.045 cents in 1890
dollars, with implied αs of 1
13.7
when using railroad costs as the comparison, and 1
37.7
when using the average Donaldson-Hornbeck values.7 Given these estimates, we use
a value of α = 1/10 in our preferred specification as a plausible, yet conservative
estimate for the cost advantage of ocean-based transportation.We also present an
alternative specification where we calculate transportation costs simply based on
6Glaeser (2011) gives an estimate of exactly this parameter when he writes “In 1816, it cost as
much to ship goods thirty miles overland as it did for those goods to cross the Atlantic”. Taking the
distance to ship over the Atlantic as at least 3000 miles, this would imply a parameter of α = 1/100.
This is however smaller than the corresponding value for 1914, since with the introduction of the
railway transport costs inland fell more than over sea in the 19th century.
7Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) also include a sea-based path from San Diego to Florida to
represent the route around Cape Horn. They set the cost for this at 8 dollars, which would imply
αs of similar magnitudes to those based on Maurer and Yu (2008).
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the Donaldson-Hornbeck land-based costs, and an assumed cost of 0.1 cent per
ton-km over the ocean. Additionally, we also show robustness to including a fixed
transshipment cost for sea routes, a fixed tariff rate for international routes, or a
fixed toll cost to using the Panama Canal.
In our baseline specification, we allow every coastal US county to act as an inter-
national port. In a robustness check we restrict the paths from US counties to
international ports to go through one of the three major US ports from the interna-
tional ports database we use (New York, New Orleans, San Francisco). These ports
constituted the most important trade gateways on the Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
coast, respectively. Results remain fairly similar, but the market access gains are
more geographically clustered and hence less robust to including state fixed effects.
The same is true for a set of ports that uses the 11 most important American ports
in 1900.
Under these assumptions, we then calculate the minimum distance of every US
county to every international port, with and without the Panama Canal. Calcula-
tions of minimum distances can be computationally intensive, but our set of coastal
counties is small enough that we can calculate every possible route and select the
minimum from all possible ones, even in the case where we allow every coastal county
to connect to international trade. International market access for county c is then
defined as
MAintc =
∑
pint
(
dcpint
)θ
poppint
where dcpint is the distance between county c and international port p
int, poppint is
the population of international port pint, which is defined as the population of the
port’s country divided by the number of major ports in the country. θ is the distance
elasticity of market access and is the second key parameter. The unit of measurement
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of MAintc is in terms of population. Irrespective of parameter θ, this variable will
increase by one if one person is added at a distance of one kilometer.
In our baseline model, we set parameter θ to −1. This is in line with the tradition of
the market access literature (Harris 1954), with standard estimates of the distance
coefficient from gravity equations (Disdier and Head 2008) and with theory on the
geometry of trade flows (Chaney 2018, Rauch 2016). Empirical gravity equations are
estimates of the impact of distance weighted populations on trade, and so estimate
the parameter we need directly. It is also consistent with the estimates obtained by
Donaldson (2018) when pooling across various commodities. Other recent studies
find values in the vicinity of -4 (Simonovska and Waugh 2014) or -5 (the preferred
estimate in Head and Mayer 2014).8 The larger the elasticity in absolute numbers,
the greater the penalty for destinations at greater distances. In our case, the Panama
Canal only affects long-distance trade, and leaves short-distance domestic routes
unaffected. Penalizing long-distance destinations thus reduces the variation that we
study. Large absolute assumptions for θ mechanically lead to results that suggest
that the canal did not affect market access. Indeed, we notice that when we compute
our market access measures for smaller values of θ, already for θ = −4 we get
descriptive statistics that we consider implausible.9
The opening of the Panama Canal changes the distances in the market value cal-
culations, so that we can calculate [MAintc |Canal] and [MA
int
c |No Canal]. We then
define the change in international market access due to the canal, ∆MAintc as the
ratio of the two. We use the ratio, which gives us a percentage change in market
8Even larger absolute values of around -8 are estimated by Eaton and Kortum (2002), Donaldson
and Hornbeck (2016) and Donaldson (2018).
9We notice in the data that gains of market access from the Panama Canal in long distance
destinations are indeed close to zero already for θ = −4 , since the distance weight is close to zero
with and without the canal. At the same time, a few domestic gains through the canal get very
large. For these intermediate distances, the distance weight remains positive when we compute
market access with the canal, but ends up close to zero without it. These differences can add up
over county pairs, and so we end up with counties on the West coast that appear to have their
domestic market access expand by a factor of more than 10, while their international market access
remains virtually unchanged.
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access and delivers coefficients that are straightforward to interpret. A second ad-
vantage of using a ratio here is that it does not change with the arbitrary unit of
distance measurement. Besides international market access, the Panama Canal also
affected domestic market access in the US, mainly by facilitating commerce between
the West and East Coasts. We capture this by calculating domestic market access
analogously to international one as:
MAdomc =
∑
cd
(dcd)
θ popcd
where cd are all potential destination counties in the US, and pop is their 1880
population. The change in domestic market access, ∆MAdomc is defined as a ratio
similar to the international one. Finally, we also calculate the change in total market
access:
∆MAtotc =
[
MAintc +MA
dom
c |Canal
]
/
[
MAintc +MA
dom
c |No Canal
]
.
These changes in county-level market access form our main explanatory variable.
We use the log of this ratio in the regressions so that the left-hand side and right
hand side of our main specification are both in terms of log difference, and can be
interpreted as time differences. We then merge this with county-level data on pop-
ulation and employment in three broad industry categories (agriculture, services,
manufacturing) compiled by Michaels et al (2012). These data are based on the US
census and are available at 20-year intervals from 1880 to 2000. They span the whole
mainland United States, excluding only North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
and Wyoming, which had not obtained statehood by 1880. In addition, we also
add data on manufacturing wages and land values in 1900 and 1940 from Haines
and ICPSR (2010). Land values are measured as the average value of farmland and
buildings per acre, manufacturing wages as the ratio of a county’s total manufactur-
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ing wage sum and total manufacturing employment. Finally, to shed lights on the
potential reallocation of populations across space, we also include data on migration.
Unfortunately, the historical US census does not allow us to identify all migrants.
However, based on birthplace information we can at least identify all the people
that live in a state different from the one they were born in. Drawing on the full
count census records available from IPUMS (Ruggles et al 2019) for 1900-1940, we
therefore create the share of a county’s population that was born in a different state.
This at least allows us to analyze long-distance migration. We merge the ICPSR
and IPUMS data with our main dataset by obtaining centroid coordinates for each
county using maps provided by NHGIS. We then use these centroids to link data
to the main dataset. In addition, we also collect basic geographic control variables
such as the longitude and latitude of a county’s centroid.
For our outcome variables, we use average growth rates over all 20-year periods.
These are calculated as the difference in the log of the respective variable at time
t and t-20, divided by the 20 years elapsed in between, such that for example
ln∆pop1880−1900 = (ln pop1900−ln pop1880)/20. Regressions are then of the form:
ln∆popt1−t0c = α + β1 ln∆MAc + β2 lnMAc + ln popt0c + ǫc.
Note that the main elements of this equation, the left-hand side and the term
ln∆MAc can both be interpreted in terms of time difference. This means that
time-invariant fixed effects, such as a time-invariant county or state fixed effects as
well as any locational fundamental that does not vary over the period of interest, are
implicitly present in every version of the regression we show. We occasionally include
state fixed effects additionally. Given our difference specification, these are essen-
tially state × year fixed effects and allow us to abstract from population reallocation
towards certain states. If the effect of market access decays logarithmically, there is
no reason to expect that within-state effects should be different from overall effects.
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Yet the meaning of the coefficient is slightly different, and it should be noted that
this specification removes a lot of potentially useful variation from the right-hand
side of our regression equation. As a further control, we always include the level of
market access (MAc), measured in a world without the canal, since we are interested
only in the effects of changes in market access due to the Panama Canal, and not in
effects from generally better market access levels. We also typically include linear
controls for latitude and longitude to level the board, and also initial log popula-
tion to adjust for the potential impact of different starting positions. We cluster
standard errors at the level of a grid of five by five degrees following Bester, Conley
and Hanson (2011) to account for spatial correlation in all our regressions. Figure
1 shows the market access gain due to the Panama Canal conditional on latitude,
longitude, market access level, log population in 1900 and state fixed effects. The
map interpolates information from county centroids, darker pixels show areas that
benefit less. The map shows the right hand side variation we use, and demonstrates
that we have healthy variation of the effect across the country.
Market access expressed in units of distance weighted population is a proxy for
actual trade flows, which we do not observe directly. Yet, it is a useful proxy: Policy
makers that evaluate the consequences of new infrastructure programs such as new
railway lines or highways typically can more easily measure the implied market
access changes in units similar to ours than the implied actual trade flow changes.In
our discussion of welfare effects below, we show how policy makers can translate the
effect into welfare estimations.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for these main variables of interest, computed
using our preferred parameters. In units of thousands, domestic market access is
around 58, while international market access is 594 with the canal closed, and 636
with an open canal. To understand why international market access matters 10
times more, we note that the US was still a relatively lightly populated country in
15
1900. The Panama Canal changed domestic market access by around 2 percent for
the average county. International and total market access both change by more,
both by around six percent for the average county. Population numbers for the
average county reflect population growth of the US over this period.
4 Results
We start by analyzing the differential impact of the opening of the canal. In Table 2,
we show results from a difference specification, where we use annualized population
growth between 1900 and 1940 (Columns 1 and 2) 1900 and 2000 (Columns 3 and 4)
or as outcome variables. The starting year 1900 is 14 years prior to the opening, and
years before the United States started the project. 1940 is an end year that gives
the canal over two decades to establish its main effect. We also report results with
1920 as end year below. The alternative end year 2000 shows the aggregate long-
term effect. The main coefficient of interest is the coefficient on ∆MAtotal. All four
coefficients have a positive sign and are statistically significant, which suggests that
counties with an improved market access due to the canal indeed experience higher
overall population growth. Looking at the total coefficient of Column (4), increasing
total market access by 1% would increase the annualized population growth rate by
0.0007, which translates to a population that is about 7 percent larger after 100
years. This implies a long-run elasticity of population with respect to market access
of well above 1. The same holds for the medium-run results in 1940, where a 1%
increase in market access is associated with a population gain of 5.6%.
Several recent contributions show that the effect of market access on subsequent city
growth can vary with initial city size. Redding and Sturm (2008), for example, find
that the negative effect of the German division was stronger for smaller cities. On the
other hand, Baum-Snow et al (2019) find that the benefits of highway expansion in
16
China accrued mostly to more important cities. A natural question thus is whether
the effects of the Panama Canal also varied with initial county population. To
analyze this, we divide the counties into deciles according to their 1880 population.
We then perform long-difference regressions for 1880 to 2000 on interactions of total
market access changes with these deciles, controlling for the direct population effects.
The resulting coefficients by initial decile are shown in Figure 2. We do not find
much evidence for heterogeneity along this dimension. Coefficients do not appear
statistically different from one another.
A related concern is that the effect may be non-linear in treatment intensity, which
would imply a miss-specified empirical model. To address this concern, we run
another non-parametric specification, in which we replace the total market access
change variable by ten decile indicator variables for the intensity of treatment. Co-
efficients and 95 percent confidence intervals of this exercise are displayed in Figure
3. The figure suggests a linear, increasing effect of treatment effect with treatment
intensity, with no clear structural break.
In Table 3 we repeat the exercise, separating the total market access effect into
a domestic and international component. We find that all coefficients of interest
are positive and significant. Coefficients for international markets are larger, which
suggests that international market access was a more important driver of population
reallocation than domestic market access. This is consistent with the observation
that US inter-coastal trade is a relatively minor part of traffic through the canal. It
is also worth reminding here that domestic market access changed considerably less
than international one.
As a next step, we estimate separate regressions for each of the 20-year intervals from
1880 to 2000 to decompose the long-difference effect from above into its different
sub-periods. These are shown in Table 4, again separately with and without state
fixed effects. We find that there is no significant effect in the ‘placebo’ period
17
1880-1900, before the US construction and before the opening of the canal, in both
specifications. Across states we see the biggest impact in the interval during which
the canal was opened, 1900-1920. We also find a continued effect for the remaining
intervals, which is monotonically decreasing towards the end of the 20th century.
Within states, we also find no effect in the period before the opening 1880-1900. The
biggest effect is again in the interval during which the canal was opened. Coefficients
show a decreasing trend and become insignificant after 1960.10
In Table 5, we analyze how the opening of the Panama Canal affected the sectoral
composition of local economies. For this, we use data from Michaels et al (2012)
on employment in three broad economic sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and
services. We show the results for every 20-year interval between 1880 and 1940,
with and without state fixed effects. Here we focus on total market access on the
right hand side. The only change to regressions we make is that we additionally
add control variables for agricultural and services sectoral share in 1880, since initial
industry shares are likely to influence sectoral developments. Columns (1) and (4)
show that all three sectors do not have a positive relationship with market changes
in the period before the opening of the canal, 1880-1900, at five percent level. Both
services and manufacturing react strongly in the period of the opening, manufac-
turing about twice as much as services. While manufacturing shows a weaker but
positive effect for 1920-1940, services shows an increased effect for this later period.
Agriculture shows a modest and marginally significant effect during the opening,
and is insignificant else.
Figure 4 plots these coefficients for manufacturing and services with their 95 per-
10It is worth reminding that the market access measures are computed using information from
around 1900 in all specifications in this table, since we do not want to compute measures based on
endogenous updates to transport infrastructure. This means that our main independent variable
becomes increasingly imprecise over time. This increased measurement error could contribute to
a bias in either direction for the later coefficients in this table. If it is classic measurement error
it could lead to estimates that are too low. If on the other hand infrastructure investment after
1900 takes the Panama Canal into account, this would lead to actual market access gains due to
Panama that are larger than the ones we measure. If so, coefficient estimates would be biased in
the other direction.
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cent confidence intervals, also for the periods after 1940. For comparison we add
the coefficients for the total population effect. Taken together, these sectors react
stronger than the total effect in the period of the main treatment, from 1900-1920,
which points to the finding that employment overall is more sensitive to market ac-
cess than population overall. This is what we expected to see. Manufacturing seems
to react faster than services, and services catch up thereafter. The trends of both
employment sectors are broadly similar: strongest in the period of the opening, with
a gentle decline thereafter and insignificant coefficients later.
A simplification that may have some justification in the earlier parts of the 20th
century would be to call manufacturing industries the tradable sector, and the service
sector the non-tradable sector. This simplification is less justified in later years,
when services become increasingly traded. This may explain why the services sector
coefficients are above those for manufacturing in the later years. But why would
non-tradable jobs react to changes in market access? One explanation might be
that tradable workers cause local demand, which in turn attracts workers in the
non-tradable sector. Estimates suggest that one additional tradable job creates 0.8
(Van Dijk 2015), 1.5 (Moretti 2010) or 1.6 (Van Dijk 2017) non-tradable jobs. Given
these estimates, we would expect non-tradable employment to react in a way that
is similar, or perhaps even stronger than employment in the tradable sector. The
finding that the tradable and non-tradable sector react to market access changes
in a somewhat similar way may be of interest to theories of spatial economies.
Frequently such models nest separate CES indices for tradable and non-tradable
sectors in a utility function using a Cobb-Douglas function as aggregator. This
would imply constant expenditures for each sector, and might for many sets of
assumptions on production lead indeed to similar reactions for both sectors due to
market access changes. Our results could give some empirical validation to such a
modeling choice.
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We consider other outcome variables in Table 6. Regressions here are exactly the
same as those in Table 2, except that we use different dependent variables here. All
outcome variables in this table are also annualized growth rates. In Columns (1) and
(2) we use average manufacturing wage growth as reported by ICPSR. Without state
fixed effects there is a positive and significant relationship, with state fixed effects it
is insignificant. We caution against overstating this result, since the wage measure
suffers from a few shortcomings. It represents average manufacturing wages, without
adjusting for occupation, education, age or any other control variable. It also shows
nominal wage growth, without taking into account real wage growth that could vary
due to changes in house prices. In Columns (3) and (4) we use the annual growth
rate of agricultural land values, and find a positive and significant relationship with
and without state fixed effects. The coefficient is smaller than the market access
to land value coefficient reported by Donaldson and Horneck (2016), but the longer
run effect accumulated over a few years is larger. Another difference is that our
measure of land values includes buildings and other improvements. Columns (5)
and (6) use the growth rate of the share of population born outside of the state
on the left-hand side. Again, the relationship is positive and significant with and
without state fixed effects, which suggests that immigration from outside the state
contributes to the population growth we find. The magnitude is larger without state
fixed effects, which means that the effect of immigration from outside the state is
more important across states than within states. The results for land values are
broadly similar in magnitude to findings for population, manufacturing wages grow
slower, and immigration from out of state grows faster.
Our analysis so far pools coastal states with inland states. In Table 7 we repeat
the analysis for counties located in coastal states only, and also for counties in non-
coastal inland states only. The coastal sample may provide cleaner measures for
market access changes due to Panama, since it does not rely on the assumptions
made for the domestic transport cost matrix. This sample also addresses the point
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that coastal states had particularly strong population growth over the 20th century,
and this different development could influence regression results in ways not captured
by the state-level trends. The cost of the exercise is that the reduced sample comes
with reduced statistical power. Coefficients remain positive, and significant at 5
percent in the long run versions. When we consider inland states only in Columns
(5)-(8) we also find positive coefficient, that are significant except for the long run
estimate with state fixed effects in Column (8). Magnitudes are larger for inland
than coastal counties, but in both cases not orders of magnitude different from the
overall effect.
5 Robustness checks
The computation of the market access variables in this paper relies on several as-
sumptions. In Table 8, we assess the robustness of our results by varying a few of
these assumptions. For brevity, we focus on total market access change results. For
ease of comparison, Panel A repeats our baseline results. We always show speci-
fications without state fixed effects in Column (1), and those including state fixed
effects in Column (2).
Throughout the paper, we have so far allowed every costal county in the US to be
a port for ocean-trade. This might be too generous, and allow for travel routes that
were in fact not used. In Panel B, we take a different approach and impose the
restriction that any ocean-based trade has to go through 3 major ports- New York
on the Atlantic Coast, San Francisco on the Pacific one, and New Orleans in the
Gulf of Mexico. These three ports represent the most important port on every coast
during the early 20th century (see for example Secretary of the Treasury 1880, Table
138, or Department of Commerce (1922), Table 293). These are also the three US
ports featuring in the Pascali (2017) database we use for our international ports.
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Panel C takes a more generous approach by allowing the eleven most used ports in
1900 to serve as points of entry and exit.11 As can be seen, these restrictions change
little in the specification without state fixed effects, but become insignificant in the
specification without. A likely reason for this is that the resulting market access
changes in these specifications are clustered around the admissible harbors, so that
state fixed effects remove a lot of useful variation.
Panel D shows an alternative robustness check, where we impose an additional fixed
cost for loading goods from domestic modes of transport to ocean ships. Follow-
ing Fogel (1964) and Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), we set this fixed costs for
transshipment from one mode of transport to another at 50 cent per ton, which
expressed in the units of our preferred specification corresponds to a cost of 56.9
land-based km. As Panel D indicates, adding such a fixed cost to every ocean-based
route changes our results little.
In Panel E, we add a fixed cost to all international routes in order to assess how tariffs
could affect our results. Actual tariffs during our period of analysis depended on the
country of origin and the type of good imported, which we both don’t observe, and
which might be endogenous to trade distances. They also were typically assessed on
an ad valorem basis, making it difficult to assign a precise value per average traded
ton. We assign a fixed cost of 5$ per ton of traded good, which corresponds to 569.5
additional land-based km. While this is a simplified approach, it captures the basic
idea that tariffs made international trade more costly than domestic one. A rate of
5$ is similar to the tariffs levied on the few goods that were assessed on a per-ton
basis.12 Judging from examples listed by the Treasury Department (1913) we think
this parameter is at the upper end of possible choices, and so it is reassuring that
11We used the top 10 ports by tonnage cleared, and the top 10 ports by tonnage entered, resulting
in 11 distinct ports: New York, New Orleans, San Francisco, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newport
News (Virginia), Boston, Galveston (Texas), Pensacola (Florida), Mobile (Alabama) and Puget
Sound, which we assigned to Seattle. For the ports and tonnages see Secretary of Treasury (1900),
Table 162.
12For example, the tariff of 1913 stipulated a rate of 50 cent to $1.50 per ton for clay and earth,
2$ for hay, and 7$ for nitrate of saltpeter (Treasury Department 1913).
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results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our baseline case.
In Panel F, we add a toll cost to all routes via the Panama Canal. According to
Huebner (1915), initial canal tolls were such that a ton of cargo cost around 80-90
cents. We therefore add a fixed cost of 90 cents, corresponding to 102.51 addi-
tional land-based km. The results are similar to our previous ones without state
fixed effects, but become considerably weaker when we look at within-state varia-
tion. It seems that making the Panama Canal more costly leads to more geographic
clustering of its advantages.
In Panel G, we use a simpler cost-distance calculation that relies on geometric dis-
tances between county centroids in the US, instead of the more elaborate domestic
cost distance matrix. This makes our results less precise, and also leads to negative
point estimates that are statistically significant in the specification with state fixed
effects. This shows that the detailed transport matrix we use for the inland US adds
important information, and that our results depend on it. For example, counties
that connect to the coast via railway might benefit much more from the Panama
Canal than those geographically closer, but less connected in terms of infrastructure.
Column F highlights the importance of using better measurement.
In our cost calculations so far, we transform the units in the domestic trade cost ma-
trix from dollars to distances and then compared them to ocean distances, taking into
account our assumed cost advantage of ocean-borne transportation. Alternatively,
in Panel H, we calculate a dollar value of ocean-based transportation, assuming a
cost of 0.1 cent per km. This cost assumption is consistent with data on actual ship-
ping rates for 1890 from Pascali (2017). In this approach, the distance weights are
expressed in terms of dollars and not kilometers. This change of unit does not affect
regression coefficients. However, in this check the weighting between shipment over
land and ocean is calibrated slightly differently, following the parameters expressed
in dollars. Conceptually this specification remains fairly similar to our baseline and
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it produces very similar results.
Conditional on market access levels, the measure of additional market access gain
due to Panama is an abstract enough variable that we find it reasonable to treat it
as exogeneous in this paper. Still, as a final robustness check we run an instrumental
variable version of our main regression specification. In this specification, we use
the (cost-) distance to the Panama Canal as an instrument for the market access
change induced by the Panama Canal. This approach addresses concerns that the
trade cost matrix we compute might correlate with endogeneous changes that oc-
cur later. It also corrects for potential bias that could arise due to any remaining
measurement error in the market access variable. We think that the distance to
the city of Panama is unlikely to influence economic developments in US counties
apart from their effect via the canal, given the latitude controls we always include,
and even more so when we include state fixed effects. The first stages for this test
with and without state fixed effects are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9.
As expected, greater cost-distance to the canal correlates with lower market access
change. The F-statistics of the first stage are 19.6 and 95.7. In the second stage we
find coefficients that are positive, significant, and similar in magnitude to the ones
reported in the OLS equivalent in Table 2.
6 Welfare and cost-benefit analyses
To assess the overall welfare impact of the Panama Canal on the US economy requires
the use of a general equilibrium model. To do this in a broad way, we rely on a result
by Arkolakis et al. (2012) that shows that on the question of how trade impacts
welfare, a large class of trade models delivers essentially the same welfare calculation.
In their notation, for real income Wˆ the share of within-country expenditure λˆ and
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the trade elasticity ǫ it holds that:
Wˆ = λˆ1/ǫ. (1)
This computation does not depend on the population elasticities we compute, but
relies simply on the market access measures themselves. This model measures welfare
effects for the country as a whole, and does not take within-country readjustments,
such as we estimate in this paper, into account. We think that this is not a big
limitation in this context, since in the cost-benefit analysis we are interested in the
overall welfare effect for the country. We take weighted averages of market access
changes and trade shares to translate our measures into representative values for
the whole country. Parameter ǫ is the same trade elasticity that we denote by θ in
our empirical model. Any empirical estimate of our paper that we show relies on a
defined trade elasticity parameter, and so ǫ is pinned down for us for any empirical
market access change measure we apply. We can measure the within-county trade
share of counties in 1900 by comparing the population in a county with the distance
weighted populations of its domestic and international markets. We also need the
change in the domestic trade share. The market access changes resulting from the
Panama Canal that we show in Table 1 are closely related. We use population as a
proxy for trade twice in this calculation, once to compute the domestic trade share,
and once when we compute the change due to the canal. The assumption that
distance weighted population is proportional to trade flows, is substantiated by the
large literature on the gravity equation in trade. So, we define:
λNoCanal = pop1900/(pop1900 +MAtotal,NoCanal)
and
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λCanal = pop1900/(pop1900 +MAtotal,Canal),
from which we infer the within-county trade share change due to the Panama Canal
using the welfare change equation above. The unit of measurement for distance
becomes important here. So far our only concern was that we measure domestic and
international distances in the same unit. If we measure distance in dollar, km or cm
is of no importance for our regression results, since this unit cancels out when we
compute our main variable, the market access change measures. When comparing
distance weighted market access population to the population of a county, the unit
of measurement of distance becomes important, since it influences this comparison.
We can normalize this arbitrary distance parameter by requiring that the resulting
population weighted average market access implies an import penetration ratio for
1900 that is the actual one, which we take to be around 6 percent (Lipsey 1994).
Using our preferred market access measures, computed with the parameters of θ =
−1 and α = 1/10 we obtain a mean welfare change of 0.8 percent of real income.
When we weight counties by their 1900 population, to get a more representative
measure for the average person rather than the average county, the weighted mean
becomes 0.4 percent. The cost of the Panama Canal was 352 million nominal USD
in 1914.13 The GDP of the US in 1913 was around 40,000 million nominal USD
(Maddison 2007). The annual welfare gains implied by our main estimate of 0.4
percent correspond to 160 million nominal USD in 1914. This suggests that about a
45 percent of the cost of the canal was offset by the welfare benefits obtained by the
canal in a single year. Even a strongly declining social discount rate would imply
that the costs were fully offset after only a few years of using the canal. We suggest
that the construction of the Canal passes a cost-benefit test easily when we use the
specification with our preferred set of parameters.
13Using conventional inflation indices, this roughly corresponds to 10 billion USD in 2018 USD.
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Two caveats to this exercise should be noted. First, the total costs of the canal
may have been substantially larger than the measure we use here if the price the
US government paid for the French company was less than the value of the French
excavations. This could have been the case, since the bankrupt French company was
not in a strong bargaining position at the time of the sale. In response, we note that
the US congress had a long debate on whether they should start from scratch in
Nicaragua rather than continue in Panama. This debate was only narrowly decided
in favor of Panama, which implies that this accounting mismatch, if it exists, can’t
have substantially influenced the economic costs for the US government. Second, the
loss of over 20,000 workers under the French command, and another 5,000 under the
US leadership, mainly due to malaria and yellow fever, implies a heavy welfare cost
of canal construction not factored in this calculation. Despite these workers being
well-paid volunteers who knew about the risks, we may want to factor this in beyond
the monetary cost from today’s perspective. Yet the cost-benefit calculation is so
strongly in favor of the canal, that even a most generous adjustment for the losses of
these workers and their families would not change the conclusion of this cost-benefit
comparison. The monetary consideration for the US government, and their internal
cost-benefit calculations, are not affected by either of these caveats.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents three main contributions. First, it provides an estimate of the
elasticity of population with respect to market access change. This is an important
parameter for policy makers that try to evaluate the potential benefits of transport
infrastructure such as a new railway or highway. We show that a one percent increase
in market access led to an increased annualized population growth of 0.14 percent
in the medium and 0.07 percent in the long run. This coefficient implies that a 1
percent change of market access in 1914 led to a population that is around 6 percent
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larger in 1940. This relatively large elasticity, which is well above one, can help
explain why the US population is located near the coasts. We also show similar
magnitudes for the growth of manufacturing wages, agricultural land values and
immigration from out of state.
Second, we show that this effect seems to be fairly similar for tradable and non-
tradable industries overall, with tradable workers reacting faster initially, and ser-
vices catching up a little slower. These results could imply that the tradable sector
reacts to market access changes instantly, while the non-tradable workers follow the
local demand shifts caused by the movement in the tradable sector.
Finally, we use a general equilibrium framework to provide a cost-benefit analysis
for the Panama Canal, one of the largest infrastructure project in the history of
the United States. It suggests that the benefits from the canal easily outweigh the
costs.
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Mean Standard deviation N
MAdom|NoCanal Domestic MA, no canal 57,744 18,065 2,425
MAdom|Canal Domestic MA, canal 58,141 17,614 2,425
MAint|NoCanal International MA, no canal 594,439 111,235 2,425
MAint|Canal International MA, canal 635,756 144,176 2,425
∆MAdom Domestic MA change 1.016 0.046 2,425
∆MAint International MA change 1.063 0.046 2,425
∆MAtot Total MA change 1.058 0.043 2,425
pop1880 1880 population 20,598 43,188 2,425
pop1900 1900 population 31,073 80,524 2,425
pop1920 1920 population 42,093 122,008 2,425
pop1940 1940 population 52,671 166,068 2,425
pop1960 1960 population 71,932 245,521 2,425
pop1980 1980 population 90,641 301,078 2,425
pop2000 2000 population 113,039 378,513 2,425
Table 1: Summary statistics for the county dataset. Market access values are com-
puted using parameters θ = −1 and α = 1/10. In this table, the abbreviation MA
stands for market access, ∆ indicates annualized growth rates.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1900-1940 1900-1940 1900-2000 1900-2000
ln∆MAtotal 0.144*** 0.154*** 0.115*** 0.071***
(0.026) (0.042) (0.023) (0.026)
lnMANo Canal -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.000 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003)
State FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425
Clusters 47.000 47.000 47.000 47.000
Table 2: Difference results. ∆pop1900−1940 denotes annualized population growth
from 1900 to 1940. The right hand side variables show change of total market
access due to the Panama Canal as well as market access levels. Regressions control
for longitude, latitude, log population in 1900 and state fixed effects as indicated.
Robust standard errors are clustered using a chessboard grid.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
1900-1940 1900-2000 1900-1940 1900-2000
ln∆MAdom 0.012*** 0.011**
(0.003) (0.004)
lnMAdom -0.010*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
ln∆MAint 0.155*** 0.071***
(0.044) (0.027)
lnMAint -0.016*** 0.003
(0.006) (0.003)
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425
Table 3: Separate for domestic and international. ∆pop1900−1940 denotes annualized
population growth from 1900 to 1940. The right hand side variables show change
of domestic and international market access due to the Panama Canal as well as
market access levels. Regressions control for longitude, latitude, log population in
1900 and state fixed effects as indicated. Robust standard errors are clustered using
a chessboard grid.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln∆ pop
1880-1900 1900-1920 1920-1940 1940-1960 1960-1980 1980-2000
ln∆ popPanel A: No state FE
ln∆MAtot -0.032 0.167*** 0.120*** 0.092*** 0.094*** 0.082***
(0.060) (0.038) (0.024) (0.034) (0.029) (0.030)
ln∆ popPanel A: State FE
ln∆MAtot 0.033 0.229*** 0.089* 0.099** 0.032 -0.028
(0.077) (0.057) (0.045) (0.054) (0.036) (0.036)
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425
Clusters 47 47 47 47 47 47
Table 4: Results at 20 year intervals. Each coefficient is from a different regression.
All regressions control for longitude, latitude, and market access levels. Standard
errors, clustered on a 5x5 degree grid, in parentheses.
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1880-1900 1900-1920 1920-1940 1880-1900 1900-1920 1920-1940
Panel A: Service sector employment growth
ln∆MAtot -0.143** 0.167*** 0.180*** -0.011 0.148** 0.170***
(0.063) (0.055) (0.028) (0.116) (0.068) (0.064)
Panel B: Manufacturing sector employment growth
ln∆MAtot 0.082 0.358*** 0.113** -0.086 0.356*** -0.081
(0.086) (0.096) (0.051) (0.115) (0.138) (0.105)
Panel C: Agricultural sector employment growth
ln∆MAtot 0.019 0.090** -0.048 0.124 0.143* -0.012
(0.057) (0.043) (0.030) (0.081) (0.072) (0.052)
State FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 2,417 2,416 2,416 2,424 2,424 2,404
Clusters 47 47 47 47 47 47
Table 5: Results for different sectors at 20 year intervals. Each coefficient is from a different regression. All regressions control for
longitude, latitude, log initial population, and market access levels. These regressions also control for employment shares by sector
in the initial year. Standard errors, clustered on a 5x5 degree grid, in parentheses.
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Manuf wage growth Land value growth Immigrant growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1900-1940 1900-1940 1900-1940 1900-1940 1900-1940 1900-1940
ln∆MAtotal 0.036*** -0.018 0.117*** 0.106*** 0.270*** 0.056**
(0.012) (0.023) (0.028) (0.039) (0.038) (0.025)
lnMAno canal -0.001 0.000 -0.009 -0.011** -0.012** -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
State FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425
Table 6: The left hand side variable is annualized population growth for manufactur-
ing wages (Columns (1) and (2)), land values (Columns (3) and (4)) and the share
of population born outside of the state (Columns (5) and (6)). The right hand side
variables show change of total market access due to the Panama Canal as well as
market access levels. Regressions control for longitude, latitude, log population in
1900 and state fixed effects as indicated. Robust standard errors are clustered using
a chessboard grid.
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Coastal states Inland states
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1900-1940 1900-1940 1900-2000 1900-2000 1900-1940 1900-1940 1900-2000 1900-2000
ln∆MAtotal 0.010 0.100 0.060** 0.063** 0.246*** 0.317*** 0.190*** 0.071
(0.067) (0.059) (0.028) (0.030) (0.052) (0.071) (0.047) (0.066)
lnMAno canal 0.003 -0.007 0.011** 0.005 -0.030*** -0.026*** -0.010** -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003)
State FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,321 1,321 1,321 1,321
Table 7: Results for coastal states (Columns 1-4) and non-coastal states (Columns 5-8) only. All regressions control for longitude,
latitude, log initial population, and market access levels. Standard errors, clustered on a 5x5 degree grid, in parentheses.
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(1) (2)
∆ ln(pop) 1900-1940
Panel A: Baseline specification
ln∆MAtot 0.144*** 0.154***
(0.026) (0.042)
Panel B: International trade via three major ports
ln∆MAtot 0.111*** 0.026
(0.029) (0.059)
Panel C: International trade via ten major ports
ln∆MAtot 0.126*** 0.019
(0.028) (0.060)
Panel D: Adding a fixed transshipment cost
ln∆MAtot 0.148*** 0.158***
(0.025) (0.040)
Panel E: Adding a fixed tariff cost
(for international routes)
ln∆MAtot 0.152*** 0.160***
(0.023) (0.038)
Panel F: Adding a fixed toll cost
(for using Panama Canal routes)
ln∆MAtot 0.109*** 0.009
(0.038) (0.052)
Panel G: Euclidean distance domestic cost matrix
ln∆MAtot -0.049 -0.181**
(0.038) (0.073)
Panel H: Cost-based approach
ln∆MAtot 0.166*** 0.181***
(0.028) (0.045)
State FE No Yes
Table 8: Robustness checks. Each regression is for 2,425 observations and uses 47
clusters. All regressions control for longitude, latitude, log market access levels,
and log population in 1900. Standard errors, clustered on a 5x5 degree grid, in
parentheses.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
First stage Second stage
ln∆MAtotal ln∆MAtotal ∆pop1900−1940 ∆pop1900−1940
lnPdist -0.077*** -0.087***
(0.017) (0.009)
ln∆MAtotal 0.179*** 0.112**
(0.061) (0.054)
lnMAnocanal -0.011 -0.099*** -0.021** -0.013**
(0.042) (0.022) (0.010) (0.006)
State FE No Yes No Yes
F-test of excluded instrument 19.6 95.7
Observations 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425
Table 9: IV results. First stage in Columns (1) and (2), second stage in Columns (3)
and (4). All regressions control for longitude, latitude, log initial population, and
market access levels. Standard errors, clustered on a 5x5 degree grid, in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Market access impact of the Panama Canal conditional on latitude, lon-
gitude, market access level and state fixed effect. The scale is in terms of 20 bins of
equal size. Darker pixels indicate areas that benefit less from the Panama Canal.
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Figure 2: Effect by initial population. The graph shows regression coefficient of
ten indicator variables for ten initial population deciles interacted with the main
treatment effect. The gray lines show 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 3: Effect by market access change. The graph shows regression coefficient of
ten indicator variables for ten treatment intensity deciles interacted with the main
treatment effect. The gray lines show 95 percent confidence intervals.
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Figure 4: Effect by industry. The graph shows annualized growth rates for 20 year
intervals for total population, manufacturing and services. The dashed lines indicate
95 percent confidence intervals for the two sectors.
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